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Abstract: Finite potential games are determined, i.e. have Nash-equilibria in
pure strategies. In this paper we investigate the determinateness of poten-
tial games, in which one or more players have innitely many pure strategies.
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1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that strategic games, in which every player has only
nitely many strategies, need not be determined, i.e. need not have Nash-
equilibria. However, if mixed strategies are allowed, such games are deter-
mined. For two-person matrix games this was shown by von Neumann [5]
and for general n-person games by Nash [4]. For two-person games, where
one player has innitely (but countably) many pure strategies, Norde and
Potters [6] proved (weak) determinateness by showing that (approximate)
equilibria in mixed strategies always exist. However games, in which two or
more players have innitely many pure strategies, need not be determined,
even if mixed strategies are allowed. A famous example is the following
11-bimatrix game, given by Wald [9], with payo matrices
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We are indebted to Fioravante Patrone and Mark Voorneveld for their useful
comments.
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(i.e. the two-person game where both players choose a natural number
and the player, choosing the smallest number, pays one dollar to the other
player).
In [3] Monderer and Shapley introduced potential games. Such games have
the nice property that they possess Nash-equilibria in pure strategies, if
the strategy spaces are nite. So, for these games, mixing strategies is
not necessary in order to get determinateness. However, if one or more
players have innitely many pure strategies, (approximate) equilibria in pure
strategies need not exist. The main aim of this paper is to provide sucient
conditions for certain classes of potential games, which guarantee (weak)
determinateness.
In section 2 some denitions, concerning potential games and the concept
of weak determinateness, are provided. Moreover, a decomposition theorem
for potential games is given. Weak determinateness for a class of potential
games, in which one player has a large action space, is shown in section 3. In
section 4 we deal with11-bimatrix games. For these games a remarkable
phenomenon occurs: there are two 11-bimatrix games, which have the
same potential function, whereas one is weakly determined and the other
is not. A characterization of the potentials, which are such that any game
with this potential is weakly determined, is provided. Concluding remarks
are presented in section 5.
Notation. For a strategic n-person game < N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N > with
player set N = f1; : : : ; ng the set X :=
Q
i2N Xi denotes the set of all
strategy-tuples and, for every i 2 N , the set X i is dened by X i :=Q
j 6=iXj . For a strategy-tuple x i 2 X i and a strategy xi 2 Xi the vector
x = (x i; xi) 2 X denotes the strategy-tuple, in which player i plays strategy
xi and the other players play according to x i.
2 Potential games and determinateness
A strategic game < N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N > is called a potential game if there
is a potential P : X ! IR such that 8i 2 N; 8x i 2 X i; 8xi; x
0
i 2 Xi we
have
ui(x i; xi)  ui(x i; x
0
i) = P (x i; xi)  P (x i; x
0
i):
So, in potential games the change in payo for a unilaterally deviating player
is measured by the potential P .
Special classes of potential games are the class of coordination games and the
class of dummy games. A game < N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N > is a coordination
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game if there is a u : X ! IR such that ui = u for every i 2 N (every
player has the same payo function, which evidently is a potential for this
game). A game < N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N > is a dummy game if 8i 2 N; 8x i 2
X i; 8xi; x
0
i 2 Xi we have ui(x i; xi)   ui(x i; x
0
i) = 0. Clearly, the zero
function is a potential for dummy games. In [1] Facchini, van Megen, Borm
and Tijs proved the following proposition, which states that every potential
game is the sum of a coordination game and a dummy game. A similar
result can be found in Slade [7].
Proposition 1 A game   =< N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N > is a potential game i
ui = ci + di for every i 2 N ,
where the functions ci; di; i 2 N , are such that < N; (Xi)i2N ; (ci)i2N > is a
coordination game and < N; (Xi)i2N ; (di)i2N > is a dummy game.
Proof. For the if-part it is sucient to observe that the sum of two po-
tential games is again a potential game. For the only-if part we see that the
functions ci = P; di = ui   P; i 2 N , where P is a potential of  , satisfy the
required properties.
Let " > 0; k 2 IR. A strategy xi 2 Xi of player i is called an "-best re-
sponse to x i 2 X i if





and a k-guaranteeing response to x i if
ui(x i; xi)  k:
If xi is an "-best response or a k-guaranteeing response (or both) to x i
then xi is called an ("; k)-best response to x i. Note that the set of "-best
responses to x i as well as the set of k-guaranteeing responses to x i may
be empty, but that the set of ("; k)-best responses is always non-empty. A
strategy-tuple x = (x1; : : : ; xn) 2 X is called an "-equilibrium of   if xi is an
"-best response to x i := (xj)j2N;j 6=i for every i 2 N , a k-equilibrium if xi is
a k-guaranteeing response to x i for every i 2 N , and an ("; k)-equilibrium
if xi is an ("; k)-best response to x i for every i 2 N . So in an ("; k)-
equilibrium every player is reasonably satised, since he either receives a
(large) amount of at least k or he can gain no more than " (a small amount)
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by deviating unilaterally. The set of "-equilibria, k-equilibria, and ("; k)-
equilibria of   will be denoted by E"( ), Ek( ), and E(";k)( ) respectively.




for every " > 0; k 2 IR. For two-person games, this denition of weak deter-
minateness, coincides with the one given by Lucchetti, Patrone and Tijs in
[2].
The following theorem shows that any potential game with an upper bounded
potential is weakly determined. In fact, such games have "-equilibria for ev-
ery " > 0.
Theorem 1 Let   =< N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N > be a potential game with an
upper bounded potential P . Then   is weakly determined.
Proof. Let " > 0. Choose x̂ 2 X such that P (x̂) > supx2X P (x) ". Then
x̂ 2 E"( ).
The following example shows that potential games, having a potential which
is not upper bounded, need not be weakly determined.
Example. Let   be the 1  1-bimatrix game (i.e. a game with two





0 if j = i
 1 if j = i+ 1





 1 if j = i
0 if j = i+ 1
 2i elsewhere
:
This game is a potential game with potential
P (i; j) =
8><
>:
2i  1 if j = i
2i if j = i+ 1
0 elsewhere
:
Note that the pay-o functions u1 and u2 are upper bounded but that the
potential P is not upper bounded. Let " 2 (0; 1); k > 0. If (i0; j0) 2
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E
(";k)( ) then j0 is an "-best response to i0 since u2(i0; j0)  0 and vice
versa. Therefore j0 = i0 + 1 and i0 = j0 which yields a contradiction. So
E
(";k)( ) = ; for every " 2 (0; 1) and k > 0 and hence   is not weakly
determined.
3 Potential games with one player having a large
action space
In this section we prove the weak determinateness of a special class of po-
tential games. These games may be characterized by the fact that there is
only one player having a large action space.
Theorem 2 Let   =< N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N > be a potential game with po-
tential P . Suppose that X1; : : : ; Xn 1 are compact topological spaces. Sup-
pose moreover that x n 7! ui(x n; xn) is continuous for all i 2 Nnfng,
xn 2 Xn and that x n 7! un(x n; xn) is lower semi-continuous for every
xn 2 Xn. Then   is weakly determined.
Proof. According to theorem 1 it is sucient to concentrate on a potential
P , which is not upper bounded. Let xn 2 Xn and choose (y1; : : : ; yn 1) 2
X n arbitrarily. Then
P (x1; : : : ; xn) = u1(x1; x2 : : : ; xn)  u1(y1; x2 : : : ; xn)
+ u2(y1; x2 : : : ; xn)  u2(y1; y2 : : : ; xn)
...
+ un 1(y1; y2 : : : ; xn 1; xn)  un 1(y1; y2 : : : ; yn 1; xn)
+ P (y1; : : : ; yn 1; xn)
for every (x1; : : : ; xn 1) 2 X n, which shows that x n 7! P (x n; xn) is con-
tinuous. Let k 2 IR and dene dn := un   P . Then x n 7! dn(x n; xn)
is lower semi-continuous for every xn 2 Xn. Since, moreover, dn is con-
stant in the n-th coordinate, we may dene l := minx2X dn(x). Choose
x
0 = (x01; : : : ; x
0
n) 2 X such that P (x
0)  k   l. Since x n 7! P (x n; x
0
n)
is continuous and X n compact we may choose x
00
 n 2 X n such that
P (x00 n; x
0
n) = maxx n2X n P (x n; x
0





player i 2 N; i 6= n cannot improve at all upon x̂ and un(x̂) = P (x̂)+dn(x̂) 
P (x0) + l  k we have x̂ 2 E(";k)( ) for every " > 0.
If we consider potential games, in which all but one player have a nite
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action space, and if we equip these nite spaces with the discrete topology,
the following result is an immediate consequence of theorem 2.
Corollary 1 Let   =< N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N > be a potential game with po-
tential P . Suppose X1; : : : ; Xn 1 are nite sets. Then   is weakly deter-
mined.
Compare the above results with theorems 4.1 and 4.2 in [8], where Tijs
proved, under some mild assumptions, the weak determinateness in mixed
strategies of games, in which all but one player have nite and compact
metric action spaces, respectively.
4 Potential games with two players having a large
action space
In this section we consider potential games where two players have a large
(but countable) action space. In the following examples a remarkable phe-
nomenon occurs: two games are presented, which have the same potential
function, whereas one is weakly determined and the other is not.
Example. Let  1 be the11-bimatrix game with payo-functions given
by u1(i; j) = u2(i; j) = i+ j; i; j 2 IN . Clearly, this coordination game is a
potential game with potential P (i; j) = i+ j; i; j 2 IN , and (k; 1) 2 Ek( )
for every k 2 IN . So  1 is weakly determined.
Example. Let  2 be the (zero-sum) 1  1-bimatrix game with payo-
functions given by u1(i; j) = i j; u2(i; j) = j i; i; j 2 IN (the player choos-
ing the highest natural number wins the dierence with the other player,
compare with the Wald-example in the introduction). Clearly, this game is
a potential game with potential P (i; j) = i+j; i; j 2 IN which is not weakly
determined.
Theorem 1 states that potential games with an upper bounded potential
are weakly determined. The assumption, that the potential P should be up-
per bounded, can be weakened a little bit. In fact, it is sucient to assume
that the corresponding coordination game, with payo-function P for every
player, has an "-equilibrium for every " > 0. In other words, if a coordi-
nation game has "-equilibria for every " > 0 this property is inherited by
every potential game with the same potential. The above examples showed
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however, that for a coordination game which has k-equilibria for every k,
this property need not be inherited by every potential game with the same
potential. A natural question now is the following: which potential func-
tions P are such that every game with potential P is weakly determined?
For 11-bimatrix games we give a complete answer to this question. In
order to do so we need the following denition.
Denition. A (potential) function P : IN  IN ! IR is determined if





P (i; j)  sup
j2IN
P (i; j)  "; (1)





P (i; j)  sup
i2IN
P (i; j)  "; (2)
or both, where B"1(j) denotes the set of "-best responses of player 1 to strat-
egy j and B"2(i) the set of "-best responses of player 2 to strategy i (here we
use the convention that supS =  1 if S = ; and supS = +1 if S is not
upper bounded).
If player 1 plays a strategy i 2 IN , satisfying (1), then it is not a great
disadvantage for player 2, if he is restricted to choose a strategy j for which
strategy i is an "-best response.
Example. Let P : IN  IN ! IR be dened by P (i; j) := i  1
j+1
; i; j 2 IN
and let " > 0. For every j 2 IN we have B"1(j) = ; and for every i 2 IN we
have B"2(i) = fj 2 IN : j  "
 1   1g. Therefore, there is no i 2 IN which
satises (1), but any j 2 IN with j  " 1 1 satises (2). So P is determined.
Example. Let P : IN  IN ! IR be dened by P (i; j) := i  i
j+1
; i; j 2 IN
and let " > 0. For every j 2 IN we have, again, B"1(j) = ; and for every
i 2 IN we get B"2(i) = fj 2 IN : j  i"
 1   1g. Clearly, there is no i 2 IN
satisfying (1). For every j 2 IN we have fi 2 IN : j 2 B"2(i)g = fi 2 IN :





P (i; j) 2 [ 1;+1):
On the other hand,
sup
i2IN
P (i; j) = +1
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for every j 2 IN . So, there is no j 2 IN , which satises (2), and hence P is
not determined.
Note that the potential in the example of section 2 is not determined ei-
ther. The following theorem characterizes all potentials P which are such
that every 11-bimatrix game with potential P is weakly determined.
Theorem 3 Let P : IN  IN ! IR be a (potential) function.
a) If P is determined then every potential 1  1-bimatrix game with
potential P is weakly determined.
b) If P is not determined there is a potential game 11-bimatrix game
with potential P which is not weakly determined.
Proof. a) Let   be a potential 1 1-bimatrix game with determined






P (i; j0)  sup
j02IN
P (i; j0)  "=2:
If supj02IN P (i; j












0) = +1. Now choose j such that i 2 B
"=2
1 (j) and
u2(i; j)  k. Then (i; j) 2 E
(";k)( ). If supj02IN P (i; j
0) 2 IR then choose
j such that i 2 B
"=2
1 (j) and P (i; j)  supj02IN P (i; j
0)   ". Then (i; j) 2
E






P (i0; j) sup
i02IN
P (i0; j)  "=2;
the proof is analogous.






P (i; j) < sup
j2IN
P (i; j)  "0






P (i; j) < sup
i2IN
P (i; j)  "0
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for every j 2 IN . Now dene the dummy payo-functions d1; d2 : IN IN !
IR in the following way:












Note that d1 is constant in i and that d2 is constant in j. Let   be the
1  1-bimatrix game with payo-functions u1 := P + d1; u2 := P + d2.
Since u1(i; j)  0 for i  j and u2(i; j)  0 for i  j this game has no k-
equilibria for k > 0. If " 2 (0; "0] and strategy i of player 1 is an "-best (and
therefore "0-best) response to strategy j of player 2 then j is not an "0-best
(and therefore not an "-best) response to i and vice versa. So the game  
has no "-equilibria for every " 2 (0; "0] either. Moreover, if " 2 (0; "0] and
strategy i of player 1 is an "-best (and therefore "0-best) response to strategy
j of player 2, then, since u2(i; j)  0, j is not a k-guaranteeing response to
i and vice versa. Therefore, E(";k)( ) = ; for every " 2 (0; "0]; k > 0 which
implies that   is not weakly determined.
5 Concluding remarks
There is a parallel between (weak) determinateness in mixed strategies for
general games and (weak) determinateness in pure strategies for potential
games. In fact, nite games are determined in mixed strategies, whereas -
nite potential games are determined in pure strategies. For games, in which
one player has an innite (countable) action space, weak determinateness is
known to be true if the number of players is two. The existence of approxi-
mate equilibria for such games with more than two players is still an open
problem. Potential games, in which one player has an innite (countable)
action space, are always weakly determined. For games with two (or more)
players having a large action space the example of Wald in the introduc-
tion and the Wald-like potential game in section 4 are games which are not
weakly determined in mixed and pure strategies respectively. So, roughly
speaking, (weak) determinateness (in mixed strategies for general games and
in pure strategies for potential games) is true for games in which at most
one player has an innite (countable) action space.
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